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In this article, Professor Hollis-Brusky revisits the claim, first advanced 
in a 1999 Duke University Law Review article by Professor Jonathan Turley, 
that impeachment is best understood as a “Madisonian Device”; that is, as 
a valuable political process that allows for factional interests and pressures 
to be resolved within our constitutional system. Drawing on Madison’s Fed-
eralist No. 10, Professor Turley argued for the importance of the Senate trial 
in particular as a means of channeling factional pressures through a set of 
representatives who would refine and enlarge the public view, lending legit-
imacy to our system of democratic governance. In this way, Professor Turley 
argued, impeachment serves a much broader purpose than simply the re-
moval of a President for a set of legalistic, narrowly defined “high crimes 
and misdemeanors.”
While Professor Hollis-Brusky agrees that impeachment stills serves a 
broader purpose within our Madisonian system, she argues that forces such 
as political polarization, party tribalism, the advent of “fake news,” and 
partisan media have challenged Professor Turley’s analysis of the value of 
impeachment as a factional pressure release valve and of the Senate trial as 
a forum for deliberative democracy and legitimacy-building. Instead, Pro-
fessor Hollis-Brusky argues that impeachment should be understood in light 
of Madison’s Federalist No 51—as an “auxiliary precaution” that should be 
deployed to strengthen and fortify the “primary control” available in our 
system to protect against bad actors and abuses of public trust and power. 
That “primary control,” according to Madison, is the electoral process—
voting and elections. Professor Hollis-Brusky draws from comparative po-
litical science to show that the Trump impeachment serves a distinctly Mad-
isonian function by fortifying the democratic process and, when coupled with 
the upcoming elections, could provide a “hard reboot” for our political sys-
tem.
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INTRODUCTION
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the gov-
ernment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.1
On December 4, 2019 Professor Jonathan Turley appeared be-
fore the House Judiciary Committee as the lone witness for the Re-
publican Party in the impeachment hearings against Donald Trump. 
On page two of his fifty-three page written testimony—in which he 
argues against impeaching Trump—Turley characterizes himself 
as a “Madisonian scholar.” 2  Indeed, of the five law review articles 
Turley references in his testimony as evidence of his decades-long 
research on impeachment, two have “Madison” or “Madisonian” in 
the title. 3 One of these articles is of particular interest here, as 
Turley’s impeachment testimony relied heavily on it: Senate Trials 
and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device. 4
In this 1999 law review article, James Madison’s Federalist 
No. 10 emerges as the Rosetta Stone of Professor Turley’s under-
standing of the overarching purpose of our constitutional system. 
In summary, Professor Turley argues that the impeachment process 
is but one of many elements built into our constitutional design to 
process, diffuse, and refine the pressures of opposing “factions” in 
our democracy. In the context of his argument, Professor Turley 
emphasizes the value of the Senate trial as a mechanism of delib-
erative democracy designed to refine and enlarge the factional 
pressures and views of the masses in a way that results in increased 
systemic legitimacy. In doing so, Professor Turley outlines a broad 
understanding of impeachment as a vital process for resolving fac-
tional divides and pressures, rather than a narrow way to hold 
 1.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 2.  See The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of 
Professor Jonathan Turley) (“I have spent decades writing about impeachment and presidential powers 
as an academic and as a legal commentator. My academic work reflects the bias of a Madisonian 
scholar.”). 
 3.  Id. at 2 n.3 (citing Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a 
Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J.1 (1999) and Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, 
and Madison, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 439, 439 (1999)). 
 4.  Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madi-
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officers to account for legalistically defined “crimes.”  Part I of 
this article reviews Professor Turley’s argument in greater detail 
for how and why impeachment should be understood as a “Madi-
sonian device” and the implications of his analysis for what rises 
to the threshold of impeachable conduct. 
Over the past two decades, a series of powerful forces have 
combined to undermine the efficacy of the Madisonian system Pro-
fessor Turley centers in his analysis—a system predicated on the 
ability to channel, diffuse, and mitigate the “mischiefs of faction.” 
These forces, as I describe in Part II, include, first, increasing po-
litical polarization of partisans in government and in the electorate, 
which has led to party tribalism and party loyalty at all costs. Sec-
ond, the democratization and fragmentation of media has led to 
partisan and polarized media, decreasing levels of trust in infor-
mation (“fake news”), and the ability to discredit and destabilize 
expertise and testimony. I show how these developments challenge 
Professor Turley’s analysis of the value of impeachment as a factional pres-
sure release valve and of the Senate trial as a forum for deliberative democ-
racy and legitimacy-building. 
That being said, I argue in Part III of this article that impeach-
ment can and should still be understood as a “Madisonian device,” 
but with a different emphasis. I draw on American history and contem-
porary comparative political science to show that impeachments in general—
and the Trump impeachment in particular—can be understood as an “auxil-
iary precaution” deployed in service of strengthening and fortifying what 
Madison described as the “primary check” on bad actors and abuses of power 
in our constitutional system—voting and the democratic process. In other 
words, if we center Madison’s Federalist No. 51 instead of Madison’s Fed-
eralist No. 10, we extract a slightly different core principle from our consti-
tutional architecture. As measured against this Madisonian principle, the 
impeachment of Donald Trump still holds value and meaning and should still 
be properly understood as a “Madisonian device.” 
I.IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE CIRCA 1999
A.Impeachment as a Madisonian Device 
Professor Turley’s 1999 Duke University Law Review article provides 
a lengthy and detailed history of impeachment hearings and Senate trials, 
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way through the Clinton impeachment hearings.5  Interestingly, much of this 
history appeared in Professor Turley’s written testimony for the House Judi-
ciary Committee in the impeachment hearings of Donald Trump.6 In the law 
review article, unlike in his most recent congressional testimony, these epi-
sodes are all then processed, digested, and analyzed through the lens of 
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10.7
Like the other essays that collectively comprise what we now refer to 
as The Federalist Papers, Madison’s Federalist No. 10 was written anony-
mously in 1787 under the pseudonym, “Publius,” in the hopes of persuading 
the people of New York to adopt the new Constitution. In a nutshell, Feder-
alist No. 10 explains how the revised constitutional design improves upon 
older models of democratic government that were vulnerable to what Madi-
son termed the “mischiefs of faction.”8
Madison defines a “faction” as “a number of citizens, whether amount-
ing to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity.”9 Factions, as Madison explains, tend to wreak havoc on democracies, 
especially when there are large, permanent factions that seek to oppress and 
limit political opportunities of minority factions. Because, Madison ob-
serves, the causes of faction—liberty and freedom of conscience—are “sown 
in the nature of man”  and cannot be removed without extinguishing individ-
uality of thought, the new constitutional republic would focus instead on 
controlling and redirecting the effects of factions.10
Essentially, Madison argues, this is done in three ways: (1) by dividing 
power vertically and horizontally to make it difficult for a single majority 
faction to gain power and representation; (2) by encouraging the existence 
of lots of factions or interest groups to promote fluidity of factional alle-
giances and cross-cutting coalitions; and (3) by electing representatives, es-
pecially in the Senate, who would “refine and enlarge” the factional views 
of the more passionate, less deliberate democratic masses.11
 5.  Id. at 110. 
 6.   See The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of 
Professor Jonathan Turley). 
 7.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 8.  Id. at 72. 
 9.  Id.
 10.  Id. at 73. 
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Professor Turley summarizes how these three elements built into the 
Madisonian system effectively “destabilize[e] the effects of factional dis-
putes” and “transform factional interests” that might otherwise boil up and 
boil over in our democracy: 
In crafting the American legislative process, Madison sought to address 
the destabilizing effects of factional disputes within democratic systems. 
Madison believed that leaving such disputes unaddressed would create in-
trigue and instability within a political system. For that reason, the Madi-
sonian process does not seek to suppress, but to transform factional 
interests. This emphasis on resolving factional disputes gives the system 
the ability to withstand crushing pressures during periods of enormous so-
cial, political, and economic turmoil.12
Professor Turley is not the first scholar to emphasize the centrality of 
Federalist No. 10 to our constitutional and political architecture. Political 
scientists, in particular Robert Dahl, have centered this essay prominently in 
discussions of “pluralism” and democracy since the 1950s.13 However, Pro-
fessor Turley does seem to be the first scholar to apply these Madisonian 
insights squarely to the impeachment clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.14
Professor Turley argues that if we situate the impeachment power 
within the architecture of Madison’s Federalist No. 10 and apply that essay’s 
preoccupation with channeling and refining factional tensions and pressures 
to the impeachment clauses, then these clauses necessarily demand a broader 
understanding than the narrower, legalistic interpretation advanced by other 
scholars. In this vein, Professor Turley argues that his Madisonian reading 
of impeachment cuts against arguments that “tend to elevate removal as the 
 12.  Turley, Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, supra note 4, at 4. 
 13.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 105–12 (1st ed. 1956); Rob-
ert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 282 (1957); Martin Diamond, The American Idea of Equality: The View from the Founding, 38 
REV. POL. 313, 329 (1976); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 
737 (1983); James Yoho, Madison on the Beneficial Effects of Interest Groups: What Was Left Unsaid in 
“Federalist” 10, 27 POLITY 587 (1995); Ian Shapiro, Tyranny and Democracy: Reflections on Some 
Recent Literature, 43 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 486 (2008). 
 14.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and 
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7 (“The 
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on 
Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And 
no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in 
Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold 
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”); 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall 
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primary purpose of impeachment in a narrow band of cases” and that advo-
cates of this narrow understanding “would radically reduce the role of im-
peachment in addressing the factional disputes and legitimacy questions” 
that are often at the core of impeachment proceedings.15
With Madison’s Federalist No. 10 as his touchstone, Professor Turley 
argues that the impeachment process should be understood as a “tool of fac-
tional resolution.”16 This is especially so, he insists controversially, in cases 
where the actual removal of a President is “unlikely due to [the lack of] bi-
partisan consensus”—so in cases where it is least likely to succeed by tradi-
tional metrics. It is during these times, when “large factional groups are in 
dispute over questions of legitimacy,” Professor Turley insists, that impeach-
ment “can play its most valuable and transformative role.”17
B.Senate Trials and Factional Disputes 
In making his somewhat counterintuitive case for impeachment espe-
cially when removal is unlikely, Professor Turley emphasizes the importance 
and value of the Senate trial as a critical forum for factional dispute resolu-
tion (or at least transformation): 
The factional disputes raised by allegations of misconduct by a President 
or judge demand resolution in a public forum. The Senate trial supplies a 
forum that would not be possible in any other branch. In the Senate trial 
of a President, representatives of all three branches are present in a pro-
ceeding in which all factional views can be openly expressed and debated. 
This is vitally important to the integrity of the system, as it has often 
changed the views of both senators and the public regarding the basis of 
impeachment allegations.18
Not just any Senate trial will do, however. Drawing on lessons learned 
from history and from his reading of Madison’s Federalist No. 10, Professor 
Turley argues that the Senate must allow “a full presentation of evidence” 
and must not limit witnesses in order to serve as a forum for deliberative 
democracy and to facilitate trust and integrity in the process, especially when 
“a partisan block promises to prevent conviction.”19
It is only through the open presentation of evidence and witnesses, Pro-
fessor Turley insists, that the Senate trial can serve to, in Madisonian par-
lance, “refine and enlarge” the public’s views and transform factional (or in 
 15.  Turley, Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, supra note 4, at 34. 
 16.  Id. at 8. 
 17.  Id. at 84. 
 18.  Id. at 42–43. 
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today’s parlance, partisan) allegiances. However, if the Senate trial is per-
ceived as a foregone conclusion, as driven by clearly identifiable factional 
interests, the process could be damaging “to the public trust.”20 Specifically, 
Professor Turley warns that “an acquittal based on tailored evidence is as 
dangerous as a conviction secured on such a basis” because it will lead to the 
persistence of factional divides, as there will always be questions about the 
“legitimacy of the process.”21
In concluding his analysis—an analysis, as several observers have 
pointed out, which seems to be at odds with his position against impeaching 
President Donald Trump22—Professor Turley defends the impeachment of 
President William Jefferson Clinton as legitimate within this Madisonian un-
derstanding and as consistent with history and past practice. In doing so, 
Professor Turley once again emphasizes that impeachment is a political, not 
legal, process, that it was never intended to be limited to a narrow range of 
legalistically defined “high crimes and misdemeanors” (as the Trump legal 
defense team argued in their 110 page legal brief23), and that it was especially 
concerned with perceived abuses of the public trust, abuse of power, and 
other non-criminal behaviors for which a public trial and account would be 
beneficial and important. 
 20.  Id.
 21.  Id. at 133. 
 22.  See, e.g., Sonam Sheth, The GOP’s only impeachment witness on Wednesday contradicted his 
own previous testimony, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2019, 2:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/repub-
lican-witness-jonathan-turley-contradicted-impeachment-testimony-2019-12 [https://perma.cc/KSY9-
QUZ7]; Charles P. Pierce, Jonathan Turley is Exhibit A That The Clinton Debacle Never Ended, ESQUIRE
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a30122007/jonathan-turley-impeach-
ment-hearing-trump-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/7LS6-H2PB]; Elie Mystal, The Republican’s Star Im-
peachment Scholar Is a Shameless Hack: Jonathan Turley’s testimony was so inconsistent, it contradicted 
his own previous statements on impeachment, THE NATION (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.thena-
tion.com/article/archive/turley-impeachment-hypocrisy/ [https://perma.cc/U7KJ-23C8]; Jennifer Rubin, 
Even the Republican witness helped the Democrats, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2019, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/05/even-republican-witness-helped-democrats/ 
[https://perma.cc/WNR4-X56R]; James D. Zirin, The shifting impeachment positions of Jonathan Turley,
THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/473227-the-shifting-impeach-
ment-positions-of-jonathan-turley [https://perma.cc/TXT4-AZAE]. 
 23.  In Proceedings Before the United States Senate: Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. 
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II. WRENCHES IN THE MADISONIAN MACHINE—POLITICAL
POLARIZATION, PARTY TRIBALISM, AND “ALTERNATIVE FACTS”
A. Political Polarization and Party Tribalism 
Madison’s insights in The Federalist No. 10 have been key to how 
American legal scholars and political scientists have theorized about consti-
tutional structure, political process, and participation— especially since the 
mid-twentieth century. To wit, in his book Law’s Allure, political scientist 
Gordon Silverstein refers to our constitutional design as the “Madisonian 
machine.”24 The so-called Madisonian machine functions best, political sci-
entists have noted, under two conditions: (1) when there are many smaller, 
fluid factions (or interest groups) vying for power in our democracy; and (2) 
when the Senate functions in a truly deliberative manner, “refin[ing] and en-
larg[ing]” (to borrow Madisonian language) these narrow factional interests 
in service of the broader interests of the country.25 As I describe below, each 
of these elements of the Madisonian machine has broken down over the past 
two decades—and these breakdowns have been especially visible and acute 
in the impeachment and removal effort against Donald Trump. 
Political scientists have tended to operationalize Madison’s Federalist 
No. 10 under the theory of “pluralism.”26 In general, healthy pluralism is 
when citizens belong to multiple different factions and have cross-cutting 
alliances that ensure present conflict on one issue does not compromise fu-
ture cooperation on a different issue. For example, a citizen could be a free-
market fiscal conservative while being vehemently anti-war and pro-
LGBTQ rights. Under our current partisan issue alignment, this would mean 
that she would more closely align with the Republican Party on the role of 
government in regulating the economy but with the Democratic Party on for-
eign affairs and queer rights. This kind of pluralism ensures continued en-
gagement and cooperation with both major political parties, with the ability 
to move fluidly between them depending on the issue. 
The citizen I described above—the one envisioned by James Madison 
in Federalist No. 10 and observed in the mid-twentieth century by political 
scientists theorizing American democratic pluralism—is of an increasingly 
rare, endangered species. The culprit? Political polarization and partisan 
sorting. Three political scientists describe political polarization—that is, the 
movement of the two major political parties towards their own ideological 
 24.  See, e.g., GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES,
AND KILLS POLITICS 284 (2009). 
 25.  THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 76 (James Madison). 
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poles and away from the middle—in the following way: “In the middle of 
the twentieth century, the Democrats and the Republicans danced almost 
cheek to cheek in their courtship of the political middle. Over the past thirty 
years, the parties have deserted the center of the floor in favor of the 
wings.”27
The effects of political polarization on the functioning of the Madi-
sonian machine have been well-documented by political scientists and gov-
ernment scholars. In Congress, for example, we have witnessed 
unprecedented gridlock, shutdowns of government, a competitive “team” 
mentality that has encouraged parties to use (or abuse) procedural rules to 
their advantage, a weakened committee structure, more power shifted to 
party leaders, and an all but eliminated representation of moderates in the 
electorate.28
The deleterious effects of polarization extend beyond Congress and our 
elected representatives. Partisan identities now exert a powerful influence on 
how Americans vote, how they think, and even with whom they choose to 
affiliate.29 So-called “affective polarization”30 pulls Americans away from 
other citizens with whom they might have ideological overlap and policy 
agreement because they identify with the other party. Leading political sci-
entists and scholars explain the origins and impacts of this particular brand 
of polarization: 
While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based 
terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent 
years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the 
other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party’s 
members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwill-
ing to socialize across party lines.31
This is the antithesis of the Madisonian ideal of fluidity, movement, and 
multi-dimensionality articulated in Federalist No. 10. When partisan 
 27.  NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL 
RICHES 1 (2008). 
 28.  Kathryn Pearson, Rising Partisan Polarization in the US Congress, in PARCHMENT BARRIERS:
POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 35–57 (2018). See generally
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); FRANCES E. LEE,
INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN (2016); SAMARA KLAN & YANNA 
KRUPNIKOV, INDEPENDENT POLITICS: HOW AMERICAN DISDAIN FOR PARTIES LEADS TO POLITICAL 
INACTION (2016). 
 29.  See generally LILIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY
(2018). 
 30.  See James N. Druckman & Matthew S. Levendusky, What do We Measure When we Measure 
Affective Polarization?, 83 PUB. OPINION Q. 114 (2019). 
 31.  Shanto Iyengar et al., The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United 
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identities harden allegiances and drive political behavior, the result is more 
rigidity on issues, fewer cross-cutting coalitions that facilitate cooperation 
across “factions,” and more tribalism which resists engaging with the other 
side, reinforcing the growing ideological divides between the two major par-
ties. 
B. Fragmented Media, Fake News and Alternative Facts 
So-called affective polarization has been an enabler of and exacerbated 
by the well-documented fragmentation of the media and the rise of partisan 
news. In the mid-twentieth century, during the height of cross-cutting coali-
tions, cooperation, and moderate parties that, to recall the language above, 
“danced cheek to cheek,”32 there were three major network news channels 
where 70% of Americans received their news or political information.33 As 
Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein explain, with the “telecommunications 
revolution” and the advent of the internet, the “plethora of channels, websites 
and other information options has fragmented audiences and radically 
changed media business models.”34 With more competition for eyeballs, 
clicks, and revenue, cable news stations, network news stations, and for-
profit internet sites have, as Mann and Ornstein characterize it, promoted 
“sensationalism” and conflict over “sensible centrism.”35
American citizens as consumers have bought in to this new media land-
scape, self-selecting into their own media silos populated by members of 
their own “teams” (that is, political parties).36 This echo-chamber effect has 
only been exacerbated by the rise of social media and Facebook.37 Citizens 
can self-select into certain news sources and block or unfriend anyone with 
whom they disagree. Even more unsettling, recent work in media and politics 
shows that when American citizens are actually confronted with political 
 32.  MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 27. 
 33.  MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 28 at 58. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at 62. 
 36.  For a thorough and harrowing account of the impact of conservative talk radio on the Republi-
can party and partisanship, see BRIAN ROSENWALD, TALK RADIO’S AMERICA: HOW AN INDUSTRY TOOK
OVER A POLITICAL PARTY THAT TOOK OVER THE UNITED STATES (2019). 
 37.  See, e.g., Michaela Del Vicario et al., Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Po-
larization on Facebook, 6 SCI. REP. 37825 (2016); Susan Jacobson et al., Open Media or echo chamber: 
the use of links in audience discussions on the Facebook Pages of partisan news organizations, 19 INFO.
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shows and programming and news with which they disagree, this has the 
effect of intensifying their own partisan preferences rather than changing 
their minds.38
Given this fragmented and hyper-polarized media landscape, we can 
understand the effectiveness of Trump-era appeals to “alternative facts”39
and allegations of “fake news.”40 These tropes are simply extensions of the 
partisan dynamics that have become increasingly salient for Americans over 
the past three decades. They prevent legislators, politicians, and citizens 
alike from hearing and processing political information outside the filter of 
their partisan priors. 
These dynamics are especially pernicious for the idealized functioning 
of the United States Senate, compromising the role Madison envisioned for 
that body as a deliberative refinery—a pressure valve for the release and 
transformation of factional pressures and passions. Though a bit more re-
moved from the electorate than their counterparts in the House of Represent-
atives, U.S. Senators are not immune from the effects of political and 
affective polarization. In fact, the current Senate is more polarized—as meas-
ured by the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans—than 
it has been at any point in history for which we have data (essentially, begin-
ning in 1880).41
The American people watched these tribal partisan dynamics play out 
right before their eyes during the Senate trial of Donald Trump. Before the 
Senate trial had even started, prominent Republicans, including the Senate 
majority leader Mitch McConnell and Senator Lindsey Graham, went on the 
record saying they had already made up their minds and that no evidence 
 38.  See generally KEVIN ARCENEAUX & MARTIN JOHNSON, CHANGING MINDS OR CHANGING 
CHANNELS?: PARTISAN NEWS IN AN AGE OF CHOICE (2013); DIANA C. MUTZ, IN-YOUR-FACE POLITICS:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCIVIL MEDIA (2015). 
 39.  See, e.g., Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House offered ‘alternative facts’ on crowd size,
CNN POL. (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alter-
native-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/P3QC-U95D]; see also Hannah Jackson, ‘Sharpiegate’: What 
Trump said and why the controversy is continuing, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019, 12:24 PM), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/5881701/trump-sharpiegate-roundup/ [https://perma.cc/HR5C-RU3Z]. 
 40.  For an example of President Trump calling something “fake news” see his response on Twitter 
to an official Getty White House photograph featuring his hair blowing in the wind and his orange-tinted 
“tan” line visible, “More Fake News. This was photoshopped, obviously, but the wind was strong and the 




is-photoshopped [https://perma.cc/2CC2-R5UF]. On the impact of the actual spread of fake news and 
disinformation via social media, see Soroush Vosoughi, et al., The spread of true and false news online,
359 SOC. SCI. 1146 (2018).  
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would change their determination to acquit President Trump. As Graham 
said at a forum in Qatar a month before the Senate trial, “I am trying to give 
a pretty clear signal I have made up my mind . . . I’m not trying to pretend 
to be a fair juror here.”42 McConnell even went so far as to say (on Fox 
News) that he was coordinating with the White House during the Senate trial: 
“Everything I do during this, I’m coordinating with White House counsel . . . 
there will be no difference between the [P]resident’s position and our posi-
tion.”43
Predictably, McConnell and the Senate Republicans voted along party 
lines to block testimony from witnesses and to not introduce any new evi-
dence at the trial, even after news leaked that former national security advisor 
John Bolton had evidence corroborating the allegations against Donald 
Trump that he had knowingly directed aid be withheld from Ukraine in ex-
change for their assistance in his own political reelection campaign.44 This 
behavior is the very definition of party tribalism. It was also reflected (a) in 
the media coverage of impeachment—with conservative outlets criticizing 
the process as a “witch hunt”45 that was seeking to overturn the 2016 election 
results and liberal-leaning outlets expressing outrage at the Republicans run-
ning a “sham trial”46 and betraying their oaths to the United States constitu-
tion—and (b) in public opinion—with 84% of Democrats supporting 
impeachment joined only by 9% of Republicans.47 Moreover, there was al-
most no movement among these blocs during the entire process.48 In the end, 
only one Republican, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), broke ranks to vote in 
 42.  Colby Itkowitz, Sen. Graham: ‘Not trying to pretend to be a fair juror’, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 
2019, 3:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lindsey-graham-not-trying-to-pretend-to-be-
a-fair-juror-here/2019/12/14/dcaad02c-1ea8-11ea-b4c1-fd0d91b60d9e_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7X5-5UJ7].  
 43.  Jonathan Zimmerman, Impeachment: Republicans are in the tank for Trump, but Democrats 
aren’t impartial either, USA TODAY (Jan, 23, 2020, 3:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opin-
ion/2020/01/23/donald-trump-impeachment-trial-senate-impartial-evidence-column/4541616002/ 
[https://perma.cc/YWT7-9233]. 
 44.  Carl Hulse et al., How Mitch McConnell delivered Acquittal for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/trump-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/5XZJ-
KX2D]. 
 45.  Indeed, there was an entire Podcast on Fox News Radio called “The Impeachment Witch Hunt.” 
The Impeachment Witch Hunt, FOX NEWS (Feb. 6, 2020), https://radio.foxnews.com/podcast/the-im-
peachment-witch-hunt/ [https://perma.cc/WUL7-523X]. 
 46.  See Michael Shear & Nicholas Fandos, Republicans Block Impeachment Witnesses, Clearing 
Path for Trump’s Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/poli-
tics/trump-impeachment-trial.html [https://perma.cc/RXQ5-SL4J]. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See Aaron Bycoffe, et al., Did Americans Support Removing Trump from Office?,
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favor of conviction on the charge of abuse of power while Democrats voted 
as a partisan bloc to convict. 
Given what we know now about political behavior in this era of hyper-
polarization and partisanship, both the impeachment and the acquittal of 
Donald Trump are completely unsurprising. When we apply these insights 
to Professor Turley’s analysis of the critical role of the Senate in impeach-
ment, the consequences of this are clear. The impeachment and removal 
power provided for in the United States Constitution can no longer be under-
stood to function as a Madisonian tool of factional resolution a la Federalist 
No. 10. Political polarization and party tribalism prevented the full and fair 
airing of facts, hearing of witnesses, and presentation of evidence in the case 
against Donald Trump. The deliberative capacities of the United States Sen-
ate and, perhaps most importantly, of the American constituents have been 
handicapped by affective polarization—that is, the inability to hear and pro-
cess political information without the filter of a partisan lens. 
In recognition of our current American reality, there is reason to be-
lieve—as one political scientist has put it—that impeachment simply does 
not work.49 However, as I illustrate in the next section, this assessment might 
be only half-correct. Evidence from comparative politics scholars suggests 
that impeachment, when followed closely by a new election, can provide a 
“hard reset” for democratic norms and a political system. That being the case, 
the impeachment and removal trial of President Donald Trump can be un-
derstood through the lens of Madison’s Federalist No. 51 as an “auxiliary 
precaution” that might serve to safeguard the “primary control” on abuse of 
power—that is, the electoral process. 
III.IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE RECONSIDERED—AN
“AUXILIARY PRECAUTION” TO SAFEGAURD THE “PRIMARY CONTROL”
A. Federalist No. 51 as an Alternative Touchstone for Understanding 
Impeachment 
When polarization and strong partisanship become the gears that drive 
political behavior and partisan media, the mechanism of transmission of our 
political information, key parts of the so-called “Madisonian machine,” 
break down. Given the dynamics driving this breakdown, which were on full 
display during the impeachment hearings and trial of Donald Trump, it is no 
longer useful or accurate to characterize impeachment, as Professor Turley 
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has, as a tool of factional resolution and a mechanism of deliberative democ-
racy a la Federalist No. 10. 
This does not mean that the impeachment power can no longer be un-
derstood as Madisonian at all or that the process of impeachment has been 
rendered entirely vestigial by partisanship and polarization. If we ground our 
understanding of the impeachment power and process in Madison’s other
most famous essay in The Federalist Papers, we glean a slightly different 
perspective on the scope and potential of impeachment: 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several pow-
ers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to re-
sist encroachments of the others . . . . If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a govern-
ment which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty 
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people 
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.50
Federalist No. 51 gets to the very crux of the constitutional enterprise 
Madison and his contemporaries were undertaking. It articulates “the great 
difficulty” of framing a government that would be powerful enough to gov-
ern but not so powerful that it would become tyrannical. Madison and his 
colleagues had experienced firsthand the so-charged “absolute tyranny” 51 of 
King George and had then overcorrected by designing a government that 
turned out to be too weak and decentralized to be effective—the Articles of 
Confederation.52 The new United States Constitution would be an exercise 
in striking the proper balance between power and control. 
Impeachment is a mechanism of control—one of many “constitutional 
means” and “auxiliary precautions” Madison identified in the structure of the 
Constitution that would serve to mitigate or prevent the accumulation and 
abuse of power by public officials.53 Indeed, Martin Diamond referred to 
 50.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 318–319 (James Madison). 
 51.  Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.ar-
chives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript [https://perma.cc/GQ9Z-GEZ3] (last visited Feb. 24, 
2020). 
 52.  On the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, see generally Douglas G. 
Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997). 
 53.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1373 (1998); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL (1995); 
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these “auxiliary precautions” as a vital part of “the restraining spirit” of the 
Constitution,54 while Joseph Kobylka and Bradley Kent Carter noted that 
these were built in as “defenses against the dark side of human nature.”55
The view of impeachment as an “auxiliary precaution” or additional safe-
guard against tyranny aligns with how most scholars and legal historians 
have characterized the animating spirit of the power. As Michael Gerhardt 
notes in his exhaustive review of the history and meaning of impeachment, 
there is “relatively widespread recognition of the paradigmatic case for im-
peachment as being based on the abuse of power.”56
Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of impeachable offenses in Fed-
eralist No. 65 provides additional evidence that the clause was meant to 
guard against “the misconduct of public men” and to provide a mechanism 
of redress for society for “the abuse or violation of some public trust.”57
James Madison himself, speaking at the ratification convention for the new 
constitution in Virginia, assuaged fears about the breadth of the presidential 
pardon power and its potential to “establish tyranny” by pointing to the im-
peachment clause as the “one security” against such abuse of power.58 Im-
peachment can thus be understood as one of many mechanisms built into the 
Madisonian machine to, in the parlance of Federalist No. 51, “oblige [the 
government] to control itself.”59
However, the “primary control” on tyranny and abuse of power, Madi-
son reminds us in the same breath, is a “dependence on the people.”60 In 
political science, we refer to this dependence on the people as the “electoral 
connection.”61 In more colloquial parlance, it is often said that if we do not 
like what our public officials are doing we can “vote the bums out.”62
(1991); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic For-
malism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 462–65 (1991). 
 54.  See Martin Diamond, Conservatives, Liberals and the Constitution, 1 PUB. INT. 96, 97 (1965). 
 55.  Joseph F. Kobylka & Bradley K. Carter, Madison, ‘The Federalist’, and the Constitutional 
Order: Human Nature and Institutional Structure, 20 POLITY 190, 190 (1987). 
 56.  Michael J. Gerhardt, Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.  603, 604 
(1999). 
 57.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 58.  Tom Ginsburg et al., The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Impeachment, 88 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 21). 
 59.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 319 (James Madison). 
 60.  Id.
 61.  See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale University 
Press, 1st ed. 1974). 
 62.  See, e.g., Douglas Bloomfield, Washington Watch: Vote the bums out, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 
25, 2019, 8:34 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Washington-Watch-Vote-the-bums-out-612129 
[https://perma.cc/57SL-VTU2] (“We already have term limits. It’s called elections. Vote the bums out.”). 
See also Ethan M. Tucker, Vote the Bums Out: The Call for Term Limits Is Foolish and Spineless, HARV.
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Regardless of what we call it, the vitality of this first-order check on tyranny 
and tyrannical behavior depends entirely on a free, functioning, and accessi-
ble electoral system. 
This, I argue, is where impeachment can play its most important role as 
a Madisonian “auxiliary precaution.” First, it can be deployed to address 
abuses of power and betrayal of public trust in between election cycles. Sec-
ond, it can and should be deployed in cases where a public official is attempt-
ing to influence and manipulate the “primary control” itself. That is, from a 
Madisonian perspective, it is especially appropriate to initiate impeachment 
proceedings against a public official who is attempting to influence or ma-
nipulate an upcoming election. 
To wit, the discovery of a coordinated operation to meddle with and 
influence an upcoming election (Watergate)63 is precisely what motivated 
the impeachment process that led to the resignation of Richard Nixon—a 
case that is widely accepted to be the “paradigmatic case” for impeachment 
in American history.64 As Philip Kurland describes, the real “crisis” of Wa-
tergate was the evidence of a slow but steady trend towards “the spectre of 
totalitarianism” and the lack of real checks against it.65 The Watergate Scan-
dal, to recall, involved a burglary of the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters by CREEP (the Committee to Reelect the President). The in-
vestigation and the initiation of impeachment hearings revealed other related 
illegal campaign practices, targeting and harassment of political “enemies,” 
and other so-called “dirty tricks” coordinated by Richard Nixon and his sup-
porters to ensure his reelection.66 And then, of course, there was the at-
tempted cover-up and obstruction of justice.67
Echoes of the Nixon-era Watergate scandal are difficult to ignore with 
the most recent impeachment against President Donald Trump. According to 
pbwatchb-out/ [https://perma.cc/8KXT-J6PM]; Dante Chinni, ‘Throw the bums out’ coalition changes 
shape in 2018, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2018, 5:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-
read/throw-bums-out-coalition-changes-shape-2018-n883986 [https://perma.cc/2PAD-N2JX] (“In every 
election there is always a group of disgruntled voters who want to ‘throw the bums out,’ and poll numbers 
show they’re back in 2018.”); Albor Ruiz, In 2020, throw the bums out, AL DIA NEWS (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://aldianews.com/articles/politics/opinion/2020-throw-bums-out/57212 [https://perma.cc/6NN6-
9H8H] (“Come November throw the bums out!”). 
 63.  For a comprehensive and detailed account of the Watergate scandal as it related to President 
Nixon’s reelection efforts, see generally FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (Simon & Schuster, 1st ed. 1995). 
 64.  See Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 604. 
 65.  Philip B. Kurland, Watergate, Impeachment, and the Constitution, 45 MISS. L.J. 531, 592 
(1974). 
 66.  See Michael Schudson, Notes on Scandal and the Watergate Legacy, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1231, 1232 (2004). 
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Congress, Trump was found guilty of “Abuse of Power” (Article I) for pres-
suring Ukraine to announce an investigation into political rival Joe Biden, 
“while withholding military aid and dangling a head-of-state meeting, 
thereby corrupting the integrity of U.S. elections.”68 Trump was also found 
guilty of “Obstruction of Congress” (Article II) for withholding documents 
and preventing witnesses from testifying.69
In Madisonian terms, the House found that Trump abused his powers to 
manipulate “the primary control” our system has for controlling tyranny—
elections. Additionally, Trump and his administration compromised an “aux-
iliary precaution”—congressional oversight—by shielding information and 
hampering their ability to investigate him for wrongdoing. Indeed, from a 
Madisonian perspective, we might say that the Trump case—rather than the 
Nixon case—is in fact the paradigmatic case for impeachment. Without men-
tioning Madison here, Professor Pamela Karlan underscored this point dur-
ing her testimony at the House impeachment hearing: 
But the Framers of our Constitution realized that elections alone could not 
guarantee that the United States would remain a republic. One of the key 
reasons for including an impeachment power was the risk that unscrupu-
lous officials might try to rig the election process. At the Constitutional 
Convention, William Davie warned that unless the Constitution contained 
an impeachment provision, a president might “spare no efforts or means 
whatever to get himself re-elected.”70
By abusing the powers and privileges of the office of the presidency, 
sparing “no means whatever” to get oneself “re-elected” and to “rig the elec-
tion process,” this abuse of power and public trust gets to the very heart of 
why Madison and his contemporaries put the impeachment clause in the 
Constitution in the first place. 
B. Impeachment + Elections = “Hard Reboot” of the Political System 
As I reviewed in Part II, the same forces that have conspired to weaken 
political accountability across the board—polarization, party tribalism, and 
“fake news”—have conspired to weaken the ability of this check to be effec-
tive in removing an impeached President from power. But recent work by 
 68.  Domenico Montanaro, ‘Impeachment Lite’? How Articles Against Trump Compare to Clinton’s 
and Nixon’s, NPR (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/13/787496291/trump-dis-
misses-charges-against-him-as-impeachment-lite-is-he-right [https://perma.cc/HPN6-VQ74]. 
 69.  Id.
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comparative political scientists on impeachment gives us reason to believe 
that the impeachment process could have important downstream effects for 
the American political system. 
New research from Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Hug, and David Landau exam-
ines the dynamics of impeachment from a global perspective and provides, 
in their words, “the first comprehensive analysis of how constitutions glob-
ally have addressed removals, and what the consequences of different design 
choices are likely to be.”71 Combining a large-n data set of impeachment and 
removal globally with more granular cases studies of South Korea, Brazil, 
Paraguay, South Africa and the United States, these scholars find that, far 
from being a vestigial constitutional tail, “presidential impeachment in prac-
tice is about far more than removing criminals or other bad actors; it often 
serves as an exit from the deep structural crises that presidential (and semi-
presidential) systems of government sometimes undergo.”72
This “exit” from crisis is especially possible, as these scholars note, 
when the design of impeachment calls for holding new elections after a head 
of state is impeached. They point to South Korea’s design, which calls for 
new elections sixty days after the impeachment process has concluded, while 
noting that many other countries also call for new elections on the heels of 
impeachment.73 Holding new elections after an impeachment, in their assess-
ment, allows “the constitutional order to hit the ‘reset button’” which, they 
argue, “seems to us like a useful tool.”74 The United States does not have 
“new elections” built into their constitutional impeachment design. We do, 
however, fortuitously, have new elections coming up at the end of this year. 
If we believe that the experience of other countries is instructive, these elec-
tions have the potential for Americans to initiate a “hard reboot” of our po-
litical system—to hit control-alt-delete and start again. 
Such a thing would not be unprecedented. The so-called “Watergate 
Babies,”75 or less controversially but more uncommonly referred to as the 
“Class of ‘74”76 elected in the wake of Richard Nixon’s impeachment pro-
ceedings and resignation, ran and won on an anti-corruption platform. This 
class of Democratic congressmen, as described by one journalist, were 
 71.  Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 5. 
 72.  Id. at 58. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 54–55. 
 75.  See generally Eleanor Clift, The Watergate Babies Remade Washington. Could the Trump Ba-
bies be Coming To Do it Again?, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2018, 1:36 AM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-watergate-babies-remade-washington-could-the-trump-babies-be-
coming-to-do-it-again [https://perma.cc/B779-JGL9]. 
 76.  See generally JOHN A. LAWRENCE. THE CLASS OF ‘74: CONGRESS AFTER WATERGATE AND 
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“young, idealistic liberals who had been swept into office on a promise to 
clean up government, end the war in Vietnam, and rid the nation’s capital of 
the kind of corruption and dirty politics the Nixon White House had 
wrought.”77 As other observers have noted, the resignation and disgrace of 
Richard Nixon opened up a rare window for bipartisan cooperation on anti-
corruption legislation that would seek to prevent future Watergate-type sce-
narios. Campaign finance legislation, the Ethics in Government Act, and 
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Budget Impound-
ment Act were representative of the post-Watergate congressional effort to 
“institutionalize” instruments “of self-purification” in government, to quote 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits.78
To be sure, there is good reason to be skeptical that the diverse, ener-
gized, SQUAD-led group of freshman elected in 2018 combined with a pro-
jected “blue wave” in 2020 would lead to the same kind of bipartisan 
cooperation that we saw in the wake of Watergate. Part II details the seismic 
shifts in partisanship and hyper-polarization pushing against that possibility. 
That being said, there is at least one encouraging sign that independent-
minded Republicans might be willing to collaborate with Democrats on anti-
corruption and reigning in presidential power. Republican and former CIA 
operations officer Evan McMullin, who has been one of the strongest critics 
of Trump, has founded a reform-centric non-profit “Stand Up Republic,”79
and has partnered with an organization led by former Obama administration 
lawyers to develop what they call a “Blueprint for the Day After.”80 De-
scribed as “an ambitious set of proposals for quick legislative action at what-
ever point Trump leaves office,”81 the blueprint focuses on the following: 
(1) restoring the integrity of elections, (2) shoring up limits on executive 
power, including restoring the Constitutional check on the President’s war 
powers, (3) ensuring that government works for the people, not the per-
sonal interests of the President and his allies, (4); protecting inclusive and 
fact-based democratic participation, and (5) rebuilding faith in the project 
of American government.82
 77.  Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-democrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/ 
[https://perma.cc/L69D-LVLV]. 
 78.  SILVERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 181. 
 79.  See STAND UP REPUBLIC, https://standuprepublic.com/ [perma.cc/5JDS-MRZD] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2020). 
 80.  See generally PROTECT DEMOCRACY & STAND UP IDEAS, THE REPUBLIC AT RISK: AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY ONE YEAR INTO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2018) https://standuprepublic.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/TheRepublicAtRisk.pdf [perma.cc/JM5X-DQ63]. 
 81.  Clift, supra note 75. 
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Again, the parallels here to the Watergate Babies’ congressional 
agenda—an agenda that, if it did not provide a “hard reset” to the political 
system, at the very least installed some anti-malware virus detection software 
onto it—are noteworthy. Both agendas are responding to what Philip Kur-
land called in his analysis “the spectre of totalitarianism”83 and both seek to 
shore up the checks—both primary (elections and democratic participation) 
and auxiliary (checks and balances) against the perceived prospect of tyr-
anny. In other words, to circle back to the driving point of this article, both 
agendas are distinctly Madisonian a la Federalist No. 51. 
CONCLUSION
With the benefit of hindsight—and the impeachment hearings and Sen-
ate removal trial of Donald Trump now behind us—it is clear that Professor 
Jonathan Turley’s idealized conception of the impeachment process func-
tioning as a tool for factional resolution and deliberative democracy is now 
defunct. Political science predicted this outcome perfectly. As Part II details, 
the forces that now dominate our political landscape—polarization, party 
tribalism, fragmented news and alternative facts—have conspired to turn the 
impeachment clauses into something of a constitutional vestigial tail. That 
being said, while the impeachment process (predictably) failed to remove 
Trump as President of the United States, I argue that the process could still 
have meaningful downstream effects. 
Relying on recent research by comparative political scientists, there is 
reason to believe that this process, because it is followed closely by a general 
election, could help provide a “hard reboot” of our political system—a sys-
tem that, by almost any conceivable metric, is in crisis. After all, some ver-
sion of a reboot is precisely what happened in the wake of Watergate. A 
Democratic Congress and President could pass anti-corruption reforms for 
the post-Trump era; reforms that would strengthen and protect the “primary 
control” against tyranny—elections—and shore up some of the “auxiliary” 
checks that have been weakened if not altogether destroyed since the 1970s. 
It would be a moment to say, as House impeachment manager and California 
Congressman Adam Schiff did in his closing argument to the Senate asking 
his Republican colleagues to convict Trump, “Truth matters to you. Right 
matters to you. You are decent. He is not who you are.”84
 83.  See Kurland, supra note 65. 
 84.  See Li Zhou, ‘He is not who you are’: Adam Schiff makes last-ditch plea to Senate Republicans,
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A reset election in November would be the moment for Americans to 
say, definitively, “[Trump] is not who [we] are.” Or maybe the election goes 
the other way. The “primary control” against tyranny and against the ever-
more-visible “spectre of totalitarianism” fails.85 And we will be forced to 
concede that yet another part of the so-called “Madisonian machine” has bro-
ken down under the weight of hyper-polarization, partisanship, and “alterna-
tive facts.” In that case, we would need to concede that Trump is “who we 
are.” But the machinery the Republicans are building around Trump is not 
the Madisonian machine. It is the machinery of absolute tyranny. 
As political scientists are all-too-fond of reminding everyone, and as 
President Barack Obama reportedly said to Republican leadership in the 
wake of the last “blue wave,” “elections have consequences.”86
 85.  See Kurland, supra note 65. 
 86.  See, e.g., Michael Steele, The SCOTUS nomination clearly demonstrates that elections have 
consequences, THE HILL (July 11, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/396476-the-
scotus-nomination-clearly-demonstrates-elections-have-consequences [perma.cc/24M8-9ZA9]. 
